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Abstract
A downlink single-input single-output non-orthogonal multiple access setting is considered, in which
a base station (BS) is communicating with two legitimate users in two possible scenarios of unsecure
environments: existence of an external eavesdropper and communicating through an untrusted relay.
For the first scenario, a number of trusted cooperative half-duplex relays is employed to assist with
the BS’s transmission and secure its signals from the external eavesdropper. Various relaying schemes
are proposed and analyzed for that matter: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-
and-forward. For each scheme, secure beamforming signals are devised at the relays to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate regions. For the second scenario, with the untrusted relay, achievable secrecy rate
regions are derived for two different relaying schemes: compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward,
under two different modes of operation. In the first mode, coined passive user mode, the users receive
signals from both the BS and the untrusted relay, and combine them to decode their messages. In the
second mode, coined active user mode, the users transmit a cooperative jamming signal simultaneously
with the BS’s transmission to further confuse the relay. Focusing on half-duplex nodes, the users cannot
receive the BS’s signal while jamming the relay, i.e., while being active, and rely only on the signals
forwarded to them by the relay. It is shown that the best relaying scheme highly depends on the system
parameters, in particular distances between the nodes, and also on which part of the secrecy rate region
the system is to operate at.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) techniques offer promising solutions to spectrum
scarcity and congestion problems in next-generation wireless networks, attributed to its efficient
utilization of available resources serving multiple users simultaneously, as opposed to conven-
tional orthogonal multiple access techniques [1], [2]. Owing to the broadcast nature of wireless
transmissions, securing transmitted data from potential eavesdroppers or untrusted nodes in the
network is a critical system design aspect that needs careful consideration. Physical layer security
is a powerful tool to achieve the goal of, a provably unbreakable, secure communications by
exploiting the inherently different physical communication channels between different nodes in
the network, see, e.g., [3] and the references therein. In this work, we design secure transmis-
sion schemes for a downlink single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA system considering two
possible unsecure environments: the first is when there is an external eavesdropper, for which
we use trusted cooperative relays to enhance security, and the second is when communication
occurs through an untrusted relay node.
There has been a number of recent works in the literature that study physical layer security for
NOMA systems [4]–[12]. Secrecy sum rate maximization of SISO NOMA systems is studied
in [4]. Using tools from stochastic geometry, references [5] and [6] study security measures
for large-scale NOMA systems in the downlink and the uplink, respectively. NOMA assisted
multicast-unicast streaming is studied in [7], where secure rates for unicast transmission using
NOMA is shown to outperform conventional orthogonal schemes. Reference [8] considers a
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) two-user NOMA setting with an external eavesdropper
and designs beamforming signals that maximize the secrecy sum rate. This approach is also
considered in [9] and [10] for multiple-input single output (MISO) and MIMO scenarios, re-
spectively, in a two-user setting, with the assumption that one user is entrusted and the other is
the potential eavesdropper. The impacts of transmit antenna selection strategies on the secrecy
outage probability is investigated in [11]. Transmit power minimization and minimum secrecy
rate maximization subject to a secrecy outage constraint are considered in [12]. Different from
the previous works, in this work we investigate the advantages of using trusted cooperative
relays to secure messages from an external eavesdropper, and also study the impact of having
an untrusted relay on achievable secrecy rates in the context of NOMA.
3Our work on using trusted cooperative relays is most closely related to the single-receiver
wiretap channel work in [13], in which half-duplex relays are employed to enhance security.
Reference [14] uses similar ideas with the focus on full-duplex relays using mixed decode-and-
forward and cooperative jamming strategies. Information-theoretic analysis of communication
systems with untrusted relay nodes are considered in [15]–[20]. References [15]–[17] consider
the setting of deaf relays, i.e., relays that are ignorant of the source’s transmitted signal, in the
presence of external eavesdroppers, and develop achievable secrecy rates based on cooperative
jamming and noise forwarding schemes. References [18] and [19] study a two-hop scenario
with an untrusted relay (with no external eavesdroppers) and provide achievable secrecy rates
for a single source-destination pair and for a multi terminal setting, respectively, with the help
of cooperative jamming signals from the destination(s). The general untrusted relay channel
(also with no external eavesdropper) is considered in [20], where positive secrecy rates are
shown achievable if the source-relay channel is orthogonal to the relay-destination channel via
compress-and-forward scheme at the relay. For a summary of cooperative security works, see,
e.g., [21] and the references therein. Similar to the previous references, in this work we also use
information-theoretic tools to derive achievable secrecy rate regions in the context of NOMA,
with trusted and untrusted relays.
In the first part of this paper, we extend the ideas in [13] to work in the context of a two-
user downlink SISO NOMA system with an external eavesdropper. We employ multiple trusted
cooperative half-duplex relays to enhance the achievable secrecy rate region through various
relaying schemes: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. For each
scheme, we design secure beamforming signals at the relays that benefit the users and/or hurt
the eavesdropper. Under a total system power constraint, that is divided between the base station
(BS) and the relays, an achievable secrecy rate region for each relaying scheme is derived and
analyzed. In general, the results in this case show that the best relaying scheme highly depends
on the system parameters, in particular the distances between nodes, and that the relatively simple
cooperative jamming scheme performs better than the other schemes when the relays are close
to the eavesdropper.
In the second part of this paper, we consider a different scenario in which an untrusted half-
duplex relay node is available to assist with the BS’s transmission. Applications of this scenario
4are when, e.g., the relay has a lower security clearance relative to the end users, and hence
transmission schemes should be designed in such a way that the relay can only forward the
data without revealing its actual contents. We derive achievable secrecy rate regions in this case
under two relaying schemes: compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward. We also consider
two modes of operations: passive user mode and active user mode. In the passive user mode,
the users receive data from both the BS and the relay and combine them efficiently to decode
their messages, while in the active user mode, the users transmit a cooperative jamming signal
simultaneously with the BS’s transmission to further confuse the relay, and hence, since the
focus is on half-duplex nodes, they cannot receive the BS’s transmission and rely solely on
the data forwarded to them through the relay. We derive, analyze, and compare the achievable
secrecy rate regions for each relaying scheme and operating mode under a total system power
constraint, that is divided between the BS, the relay, and the users if operating in the active
mode. As in the first part of the paper, the results also show in this case that the best relaying
scheme and operating mode depends, in particular, on the distances between the nodes, with a
general superiority of the active user mode over the passive user mode.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a downlink NOMA system where a BS is communicating with two users. All
nodes, including the BS, are equipped with single antennas. Channels from the BS to the users are
fixed during the communication session, and are known at the BS. In a typical NOMA downlink
setting, the BS uses superposition coding to send messages to the two users simultaneously. The
user with a relatively worse channel condition (weak user) decodes its message by treating the
other user’s interfering signal as noise, while the user with a relatively better channel condition
(strong user) first decodes the weak user’s message, by treating its own interfering signal as
noise, and then uses successive interference cancellation to decode its own message.1
All channel gains in this paper are complex-valued, and are drawn independently from some
continuous distribution. We denote the channel between the BS and the strong user (resp. weak
user) by h1 (resp. h2), with |h1|2 ≥ |h2|2. The channel gains h1 and h2 are known at the BS.
1The two-user setting in this work is adopted in NOMA systems in which users are divided into multiple clusters with two
users each, in order to reduce error propagation in successive interference cancellation decoding [1].
5The received signals at the strong and weak users are given by
y1 = h1x+ n1, (1)
y2 = h2x+ n2, (2)
where the noise terms n1 and n2 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance, CN (0, 1),
and the transmitted signal x is given by
x =
√
αPs1 +
√
α¯Ps2, (3)
where s1 and s2 are i.i.d. ∼ CN (0, 1) information carrying signals for the strong and the
weak user, respectively, P is the BS’s transmit power budget, α ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of
power allocated to the strong user, and α¯ , 1 − α. Using superposition coding and successive
interference cancellation decoding, one achieves the following rates of this (degraded) Gaussian
broadcast channel [22]:2
r1 = log
(
1 + |h1|2αP
)
, (4)
r2 = log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P
1 + |h2|2αP
)
. (5)
In the next sections, we discuss several relaying schemes to deliver secure data to both users.
Specifically, in Section III, we investigate the case in which multiple cooperative trusted relays
help securing the data from an external eavesdropper, and then we investigate the case of having
an untrusted relay in Section IV.
III. TRUSTED RELAYS WITH AN EXTERNAL EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we consider the situation in which there is an external eavesdropper that is
monitoring the communication between the BS and the users. We denote the channel between
the BS and the eavesdropper by he, and assume that it is known at the BS. The received signal
at the eavesdropper is given by
ye = hex+ ne, (6)
2The log terms in this paper denote natural logarithms.
6where the noise term ne ∼ CN (0, 1). For a given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the secrecy capacities of the two
users in this multi-receiver wiretap channel are given by [23, Theorem 5]
rs,1=
[
log
(
1 + |h1|2αP
)− log (1 + |he|2αP )]+, (7)
rs,2=
[
log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P
1 + |h2|2αP
)
− log
(
1 +
|he|2α¯P
1 + |he|2αP
)]+
, (8)
where the subscript s, here and throughout the paper, is to denote secrecy rates, and [x]+ ,
max{x, 0}.
It is clear from (7) and (8) that sending secure data depends on the eavesdropper’s channel
condition with respect to that of the legitimate users. Therefore, we propose using trusted
cooperative half-duplex relay nodes, see Fig. 1, to assist the BS via three possible schemes:
cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. In all of these schemes,
the BS uses only a portion of its available power P¯ ≤ P for its own transmission, and shares
the remaining portion P − P¯ with the relays for their transmission. The main reason behind
such power reduction at the BS is to have a fair comparison between relaying and non-relaying
scenarios. This way, the value of P represents a system’s total power budget that is to be
distributed among its different transmitting nodes. We note that such approach has been adopted
in the single-user setting in [13], and that without it, one would have the (unrealistic) ability to
add beneficial relay nodes at no additional cost. Our numerical results in Section V, however,
show that under a total system’s power budget, some relaying schemes might not be that helpful
in situations where relays are relatively far away from the BS. We discuss the relaying schemes
in details over the next subsections. In what follows, we introduce the relays’ channels notation
that we use.
Let there be K relays, and denote the channel gains from the BS to the relays by the vector
hr , [hr,1, . . . , hr,K ].
3 Let g1, g2, and ge denote the K-length channel gain vectors from the
relays to the first user, the second user, and the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that
|g1,k|2 ≥ |g2,k|2, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. That is, the strong user with respect to the BS is also strong
with respect to the kth relay. This is satisfied, for instance, in the typical scenario in which the
relays are closer to the BS than both legitimate users. The relays are cooperative in the sense
that they design their transmission schemes based upon sharing knowledge of their channel state
3All vectors in this paper are column vectors. For instance, hr is a K × 1 vector.
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Fig. 1. Downlink NOMA system model, with cooperative relays, and an external eavesdropper.
information (CSI) among themselves, as in [13]. The channels from the relays to the users and
the eavesdropper are known at the relays, and at the BS.
We note that assuming perfect knowledge of the external eavesdropper’s CSI at the legitimate
transmitters enables developing a fundamental understanding of how cooperation can enhance
security in NOMA settings by characterizing achievable secrecy rate regions. Other situations
in which only partial/statistical knowledge of external eavesdroppers’ CSI is available have
been considered in the physical layer security literature through providing worst case security
guarantees via, e.g., characterizing secrecy outage probabilities, see [3] and the references therein.
This is different from the approach considered in this paper, and is delegated to future works
on the subject.
A. Cooperative Jamming
In this subsection, we discuss the cooperative jamming scheme. Simultaneously with the BS’s
transmission, the relays transmit an artificial noise/cooperative jamming signal Jz, where J ∈
CK is a beamforming vector and z ∼ CN (0, 1), and hence the received signals at the users and
the eavesdropper are in this case are given by
y1 = h1x+ g
†
1Jz + n1, (9)
y2 = h2x+ g
†
2Jz + n2, (10)
ye = hex+ g
†
eJz + ne, (11)
where the superscript † denotes the conjugate transpose operation. The signal power is now set
to E [|x|2] = P¯ ≤ P , where E[·] is the expectation operator, and the remaining portion P − P¯
is used to power the relays, i.e., E
[
(Jz)† (Jz)
]
= J †J = P − P¯ .
8Designing the jamming signal is such that it has minimal effect on the legitimate users as
follows:
[g1 g2]
†
J , G†J = 0(2), (12)
where 0(2) denotes an all-zero (column) vector of size 2. Thus, we choose J in the null space of
the matrix G†. If there exist K ≥ 3 relays, then G† will always have a nonempty null space and
(12) will have a nontrivial solution. We denote such null space jamming signal by Jo. Since the
channel state vectors g1, g2, and ge are drawn from a continuous distribution, they are therefore
linearly independent with probability 1 (w.p. 1). Thus, we have
∣∣g†eJo∣∣ > 0, w.p. 1. (13)
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rates are now given by (7) and (8) after replacing he by h˜e
defined as
h˜e , he
/(
1 +
∣∣g†eJo∣∣2) . (14)
We now find the optimal Jo that maximally degrades the eavesdropper’s channel (subject to
not affecting the legitimate users’ channels). Upon replacing he in (7) and (8) by h˜e defined
above, one can directly see that both legitimate users’ secrecy rates are increasing in
∣∣g†eJo∣∣2.
Therefore, to maximize them, we formulate the following optimization problem for a given
transmit power P¯ :
max
Jo
∣∣g†eJo∣∣2
s.t. G†Jo = 0(2)
J †oJo = P − P¯ . (15)
The above problem has a unique solution [24] (see also [13]), which we derive next for com-
pleteness. We first rewrite the first constraint slightly differently as follows:
Jo = P⊥(G)uJ , (16)
for some vector uJ ∈ CK to be designed, and P⊥(G) is the orthogonal projection matrix onto
9the null space of G† given by
P⊥(G) , IK −G
(
G†G
)−1
G†, (17)
where IK is the K-dimensional identity matrix. It is now direct to see that the vector uJ should
be chosen along the same direction of P⊥(G) ge in order to maximize
∣∣g†eJo∣∣2. Finally, to satisfy
the power constraint, the optimal beamforming vector, Jˆo, is given by
Jˆo =
P⊥(G) ge
‖P⊥(G) ge‖
√
P − P¯ , (18)
which, upon substituting in (14), achieves the following secrecy rates for a given transmit power
P¯ and power fraction α:
rJs,1=
[
log
(
1 + |h1|2αP¯
)−log
(
1 +
|he|2αP¯
1 + g†eP⊥(G)ge
(
P − P¯ )
)]+
, (19)
rJs,2=
[
log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P¯
1 + |h2|2αP¯
)
− log
(
1 +
|he|2α¯P¯
1+|he|2αP¯+g†eP⊥(G) ge
(
P − P¯ )
)]+
, (20)
where the superscript J is to denote the cooperative jamming scheme.
In Section V, we discuss the evaluation of the optimal transmit power P¯ and the power fraction
α that maximize the secrecy rate region of this cooperative jamming scheme, along with those
that maximize the secrecy rate regions of the other relaying schemes that we consider in the
upcoming subsections.
B. Decode-and-Forward
In this subsection, we discuss the decode-and-forward scheme. Different from cooperative
jamming, communication takes place in the decode-and-forward scheme over two phases. In the
first phase, the BS broadcasts the messages to both the relays and the legitimate users. In the
second phase, the relays forward the messages that they decoded to the legitimate users. The
eavesdropper overhears the communication during both phases.
The received signals during the first phase at the legitimate users and the eavesdropper are
given by (1)–(2) and (6), respectively, with a total transmit power P¯ ≤ P . The received signals
10
at the relays during the first phase are given by
yr = hrx+ nr, (21)
where the noise term vector nr ∼ CN (0, IK). During the first phase, each relay first decodes
the weak user’s message by treating the strong user’s interfering signal as noise, and then uses
successive interference cancellation to decode the strong user’s message. Thus, the achievable
rates at the kth relay after the first phase are
Rk,1 = log
(
1 + |hr,k|2αP¯
)
(22)
Rk,2 = log
(
1 +
|hr,k|2α¯P¯
1 + |hr,k|2αP¯
)
(23)
In the second phase, the relays form the transmitted signal xr, which is exactly as in (3) but
after replacing P with P − P¯ . We assume that the relays use the same power fraction α in
the second phase. While in general each relay can use a different power fraction, we use the
same fraction for simplicity of presentation of the scheme hereafter. The relays use a unit-norm
beamforming vector d ∈ CK during the second phase, to be designed, i.e., the kth relay multiplies
the transmitted signal xr by dk and sends it through the channel, and hence the received signals
at the legitimate users and the eavesdropper are given by
yr1 = g1
†dxr + n
r
1, (24)
yr2 = g2
†dxr + n
r
2, (25)
yre = ge
†dxr + n
r
e, (26)
where the superscript r is to denote signals received from the relays, and the noise terms nr1,
nr2, and n
r
e are i.i.d. ∼ CN (0, 1). We let the relays use independent codewords from those used
by the BS to forward their messages. Therefore, the achieved rates at the legitimate users after
the second phase are given by (27) and (28) at the top of next page [25, Theorem 16.2], with
the superscript DF denoting decode-and-forward.
The first terms in the two minima in (27) and (28) represent the rates achieved through
combining the signals from the BS and the relays at the users, while the second terms bind
them by the achievable rates at the relays (from the BS), i.e., by the relays’ ability to decode.
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rDF1 = min
{
log
(
1 + |h1|2αP¯
)
+ log
(
1 +
∣∣∣g†1d∣∣∣2 α (P − P¯ )
)
, min
1≤k≤K
Rk,1
}
(27)
rDF2 = min

log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P¯
1 + |h2|2αP¯
)
+ log

1 +
∣∣∣g†2d∣∣∣2 α¯ (P − P¯)
1 +
∣∣∣g†2d∣∣∣2 α (P − P¯ )

 , min
1≤k≤K
Rk,2


(28)
Observe that since |g1,k|2 ≥ |g2,k|2, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, it follows that
∣∣∣g†1d∣∣∣2 ≥ ∣∣∣g†2d∣∣∣2, ∀d ∈ CK . This
ensures the ability of the strong user to decode the weak user’s forwarded message from the
relays successfully before employing successive interference cancellation.
We note that if the relays were to use the same codewords as those used by the BS, then one can
view the whole system as a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) system at each user, wherein the
first term in the minimum in (27) would slightly change to log
(
1 + |h1|2αP¯ +
∣∣∣g†1d∣∣∣2 α (P − P¯ )
)
,
i.e., the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the strong user get added up, representing the SIMO
capacity, see, e.g., the approach in [13]. Similar changes would also occur to the first term in the
minimum in (28). We note that whether independent codewords or the same codewords are to
be used at the relays, the approach we follow in the sequel to design the optimal beamforming
vector d would not change. We choose, however, to continue with the independent codewords
assumption as it achieves rates that are no smaller than those achieved via using the same
codewords.
For K ≥ 2, we design the beamforming vector d to be a unit-norm vector orthogonal to ge,
and denote it by do. This way, the eavesdropper does not gain any useful information during
the second phase. Thus, we have
g†edo = 0. (29)
Further, for K ≥ 3, we have that {g1, g2, ge} are linearly independent w.p. 1, and hence
|g†1do| > 0, |g†2do| > 0, w.p. 1. (30)
Thus, the achievable secrecy rates in this case are given by
rDFs,1 =
1
2
[
rDF1 − log
(
1 + |he|2αP¯
)]+
, (31)
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rDFs,2 =
1
2
[
rDF2 − log
(
1 +
|he|2α¯P¯
1 + |he|2αP¯
)]+
, (32)
where the extra multiplication by 1
2
is due to transmission of the same message over two phases
with equal durations.
Now that we settled the achievable secrecy rates, we turn to further optimizing the beam-
forming vector do. Toward that end, we rewrite the constraint in (29) slightly differently as
follows:
do = P⊥(ge)ud, (33)
where P⊥(·), as defined in (17), now represents a projection matrix onto the orthogonal com-
plement of vectors in CK , and ud ∈ CK is some vector to be designed. Next, it is direct to
see that rDF1 is non-decreasing in
∣∣∣g†1do∣∣∣2 and that rDF2 , after simple first derivative analysis, is
also non-decreasing in
∣∣∣g†2do∣∣∣2. Hence, one needs to choose do to maximize these terms. We
propose maximizing their convex combination β
∣∣∣g†1do∣∣∣2+(1−β) ∣∣∣g†2do∣∣∣2, for some 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of
choice. Using (33), and after simple manipulations, the optimal uˆd that maximizes such convex
combination is given by the solution of the following problem:
max
ud
u
†
dP⊥(ge)
(
βg1g
†
1 + (1− β)g2g†2
)
P⊥(ge)ud
s.t. u
†
dP⊥(ge)ud = 1, (34)
and therefore uˆd is given by the leading eigenvector of the (Hermitian) matrix:
P⊥(ge)
(
βg1g
†
1 + (1− β)g2g†2
)
P⊥(ge) , (35)
i.e., the eigenvector corresponding to its largest eigenvalue. Finally, the optimal dˆo that solves
problem (34) is given by
dˆo =
P⊥(ge) uˆd
‖P⊥(ge) uˆd‖ . (36)
Given dˆo, we substitute in (31) and (32) to get the achievable secrecy rates.
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C. Amplify-and-Forward
In this subsection, we discuss the amplify-and-forward scheme. As in the decode-and-forward
scheme, communication takes place over two phases and the eavesdropper overhears the com-
munication during the two phases.
In the first phase, the received signals at the legitimate users, eavesdropper, and relays are
given by (1)–(2), (6), and (21), respectively, with a total transmit power P¯ ≤ P . In the second
phase, the kth relay amplifies its received signal by multiplying it by a constant ak and sends it
through the channel. Effectively, this can be written as the multiplication: diag (a)yr, where
a ∈ CK is a beamforming vector to be designed, and diag (a) is a diagonalization of the
vector a. The received signals at the legitimate users and the eavesdropper in the second phase
are given by
yr1 = g
†
1diag (a)yr + n
r
1, (37)
yr2 = g
†
2diag (a)yr + n
r
2, (38)
yre = g
†
ediag (a)yr + n
r
e. (39)
Now observe that from, e.g., the strong user’s perspective, this amplify-and-forward scheme can
be viewed, using (21), as the following SIMO system:
y1
yr1

 =

 h1
g
†
1diag (a)hr

 x+

n1
n˜r1

 , (40)
where the noise term n˜r1 , g
†
1diag (a)nr + n
r
1 is complex-Gaussian with zero mean and
variance E [|n˜r1|2] = g†1diag (a∗)diag (a)g1+1, with the superscript ∗ denoting the conjugate
operation. One can write similar equations for the weak user as well. Hence, the achievable rates
at the legitimate users of this SIMO system after the second phase are given by [26, Section
5.3.1]
rAF1 =log
(
1+ |h1|2αP¯ + a
†G1,ra
1 + a†G1a
αP¯
)
, (41)
rAF2 =log
(
1+
|h2|2α¯P¯
1 + |h2|2αP¯ +
a†G2,raα¯P¯
1 + a†G2a+ a†G2,raαP¯
)
, (42)
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where the superscript AF is to denote amplify-and-forward achievable rates, and
Gj,r , diag (h
∗
r) gjg
†
jdiag (hr) , j = 1, 2, (43)
Gj , diag
(
g∗j
)
diag (gj) , j = 1, 2. (44)
Since |g1,k|2 ≥ |g2,k|2, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, it can be shown that a
†
G1,raα¯P¯
1+a†G1a+a†G1,raαP¯
≥ a†G2,raα¯P¯
1+a†G2a+a†G2,raαP¯
,
∀a ∈ CK , and hence, successive interference cancellation would be successfully employed at
the strong user.
As for the eavesdropper, observe that by (21) we have
g†ediag (a)yr = g
†
ediag (a)hrx+ g
†
ediag (a)nr. (45)
Upon noting that g†ediag (a)hr = g
†
ediag (hr)a, we propose, for K ≥ 2, designing the
beamforming vector a to be orthogonal to the vector diag (h∗r)ge and denote it by ao. This
way, the eavesdropper does not gain any useful information during the second phase. Thus, we
have
g†ediag (hr)ao = 0. (46)
As in the decode-and-forward scheme, we further have for K ≥ 3 that {g1, g2, ge} are linearly
independent w.p. 1, and therefore
|g†1diag (hr)ao| > 0, |g†2diag (hr)ao| > 0, w.p. 1. (47)
Thus, the achievable secrecy rates in this case are given by
rAFs,1 =
1
2
[
rAF1 − log
(
1 + |he|2αP¯
)]+
, (48)
rAFs,2 =
1
2
[
rAF2 − log
(
1 +
|he|2 (1− α) P¯
1 + |he|2αP¯
)]+
, (49)
where the extra multiplication by 1
2
is due to transmission of the same message over two phases
of equal durations, as in the decode-and-forward scheme.
We now focus on further optimizing the beamforming vector ao. Toward that end, we first
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note that the power transmitted in the second phase by the relays is given by
E
[
a†odiag (y
∗
r)diag (yr)ao
]
= a†o
(
diag (h∗r)diag (hr) P¯ + IK
)
ao , a
†
oAao. (50)
Next, we rewrite the constraint (46) slightly differently as
ao = P⊥(diag (hr) ge)ua , Fua (51)
for some vector ua ∈ CK to be designed. Next, we note that for the strong user, using (50) and
(51), finding the optimal ua is tantamount to solving the following problem (note that F is a
Hermitian matrix):
max
ua
u†aFG1,rFua
1 + u†aFG1Fua
s.t. u†aFAFua=P − P¯ , (52)
which can be equivalently rewritten as the following problem:
max
ua
u†aFG1,rFua
u
†
aF
(
1
P−P¯
A+G1
)
Fua
, (53)
whose solution is given by the leading generalized eigenvector [27] of the following matrix
pencil:
(
FG1,rF , F
(
1
P − P¯A+G1
)
F
)
, (54)
i.e., the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue of the pencil.
Let us denote such vector by u
(1)
a . Similarly, one can show that the optimal ua for the weak
user is given by the leading generalized eigenvector of the following matrix pencil:
(
FG2,rF , F
(
1
P − P¯A+G2 +G2,rαP¯
)
F
)
, (55)
which we denote by u
(2)
a . To satisfy the power constraint (50) and the orthogonality constraint
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(51), the corresponding a
(j)
o , j = 1, 2, is given by
a(j)o =
√
P − P¯
u
(j)T
a FAFu
(j)
a
Fu(j)a , j = 1, 2. (56)
Then, as in the decode-and-forward scheme, we propose choosing the optimal aˆo by the following
convex combination:
aˆo = βa
(1)
o + (1− β)a(2)o (57)
for some 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of choice. Given aˆo, we substitute in (48) and (49) to get the achievable
secrecy rates.
IV. COMMUNICATING WITH AN UNTRUSTED RELAY
In this section, we consider the situation in which an untrusted half-duplex relay node is
available to assist with the BS’s transmission.4 The relay is untrusted in the sense that it should
be kept ignorant of the messages sent towards the users. However, it is assumed that the relay
is unmalicious in the sense that it would not deviate from its transmission scheme, or attempt
to hurt the users; it can only be curious enough to attempt to decode the users’ messages.
Such communication scenario has practical applications. For instance, users of a data providing
network may have access to different data contents based on their subscription plans, or have
hierarchal security clearances for different types of data. Since users are valid members of the
same network, they have the incentive (or are required) to help each other and abide by the
network protocols. The untrusted user, which is the relay in our case, however, can be curious
enough to decode the contents of its received signals before forwarding them to the users. Such
untrusted relay node is often called honest-but-curious in the literature, and has been adopted as
the main model of study in, e.g., [18]–[20].
Let the received signal by the relay from the BS be given by
yr = hrx+ nr, (58)
4We work with only one untrusted relay in this section, as opposed to the previous one, so as to better illustrate the main
ideas behind the relaying schemes. The schemes, however, can be readily extended to the case of multiple untrusted relays by
following, e.g., an opportunistic/worst case approach in which the design takes into consideration only the most effective/powerful
relay node.
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where hr denotes the channel between the BS and the relay, and the noise term nr ∼ CN (0, 1).
One direct approach to deal with this untrusted relay situation is to simply treat it as an external
eavesdropper. This way, for a given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the following secrecy rates are achievable for
this multi-receiver wiretap channel [23, Theorem 5] (these are the same as in (7) and (8) after
replacing he with hr):
rs,1 =
[
log
(
1 + |h1|2αP
)− log (1 + |hr|2αP )]+ , (59)
rs,2 =
[
log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P
1 + |h2|2αP
)
−log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P
1 + |hr|2αP
)]+
. (60)
Clearly, this leads to zero secrecy rates if the relay is closer to the BS than the users and
has a relatively better channel, i.e., if |hr|2 > |h1|2 (and hence |hr|2 > |h2|2 by assumption).
However, it has been shown in [20] that positive secrecy rates can be achieved via compress-
and-forward and amplify-and-forward relaying schemes, as opposed to treating the relay as an
external eavesdropper, when the relay-to-users channel is orthogonal to the BS-to-relay channel,
which is the case for instance if the relay’s operation is half-duplex as in this section.
In the sequel, we extend the ideas of [20] to work in the context of NOMA, i.e., with multiple
receivers, under two different modes of operation, namely, the passive user mode and the active
user mode, as discussed next.
A. Passive User Mode
In the passive user mode, communication occurs over two phases. During the first phase,
the BS broadcasts its messages to the users and to the relay. Then, the relay employs either a
compress-and-forward or an amplify-and-forward scheme during the second phase to transmit
its received message in the first phase towards the users, see Fig. 2. The received signals at the
users during the second phase are given by
yr1 = g1xr + n
r
1, (61)
yr2 = g2xr + n
r
2, (62)
where xr is the signal transmitted by the relay, gj is the channel between the relay and user j,
and the noise terms nj,r, j = 1, 2, are i.i.d. ∼ CN (0, 1). The relay-to-users channel gains are
such that |g1|2 ≥ |g2|2, i.e., the strong user with respect to the BS is also strong with respect to
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Fig. 2. Downlink NOMA system model with an untrusted relay node, and passive users.
the untrusted relay, as assumed in the trusted relays scenario of Section III. The system’s total
power budget P is divided into P¯ ≤ P for the BS and P − P¯ for the relay. We discuss the
achievable secrecy rates under the two relaying schemes next.
1) Compress-and-Forward: Under the compress-and-forward scheme, the relay compresses
its received signal yr into another signal yˆr , yr + nQ, where nQ is the quantization noise, and
then encodes the quantized signal into its transmitted signal xr. Following the results in [20,
Theorem 3], setting nQ ∼ CN
(
0, σ2Q
)
and xr ∼ CN
(
0, P − P¯), the achievable rates at the
users under superposition coding are given by
rCF,P1 = I (x; h1x+ n1, hrx+ nr + nQ|s2)
= log
(
1 + |h1|2αP¯ + |hr|
2αP¯
1 + σ2Q
)
, (63)
rCF,P2 = I (s2; h2x+ n2, hrx+ nr + nQ)
= log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P¯
1 + |h2|2αP¯ +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + |hr|2αP¯ + σ2Q
)
, (64)
where the superscript CF, P is to denote the compress-and-forward scheme under the passive
user mode, and I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information measure [22]. The quantization noise
power is designed to ensure decodability at both users by satisfying [20, Theorem 3]
I (xr; g1xr + n
r
1)>I (hrx+ nr + nQ; hrx+ nr|h1x+ n1) , (65)
i.e.,
log
(
1 + |g1|2(P − P¯ )
)
> log
(
1 +
(|hr|2 + |h1|2) P¯ + 1(|h1|2P¯ + 1)σ2Q
)
, (66)
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for the strong user, and
I (xr; g2xr + n
r
2)>I (hrx+ nr + nQ; hrx+ nr|h2x+ n2) , (67)
i.e.,
log
(
1 + |g2|2(P − P¯ )
)
> log
(
1 +
(|hr|2 + |h2|2) P¯ + 1(|h2|2P¯ + 1)σ2Q
)
, (68)
for the weak user. Upon observing that the achievable rates in (63) and (64) are both decreasing
in σ2Q, we get from the above inequalities that one should set
σ2Q = max
{
(|hr|2 + |h1|2) P¯ + 1
|g1|2(P − P¯ )(|h1|2P¯ + 1) ,
(|hr|2 + |h2|2) P¯ + 1
|g2|2(P − P¯ )(|h2|2P¯ + 1)
}
=
(|hr|2 + |h2|2) P¯ + 1
|g2|2(P − P¯ )(|h2|2P¯ + 1) , (69)
where the second equality follows since |h1|2 ≥ |h2|2 and |g1|2 ≥ |g2|2. Therefore, the achievable
secrecy rates are given by [20, Theorem 3]
rCF,Ps,1 =
1
2
[
rCF,P1 − log
(
1 + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
, (70)
rCF,Ps,2 =
1
2
[
rCF,P2 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
, (71)
where the extra 1/2 term is due to sending the same message over two phases of equal durations
as in Sections III-B and III-C.
2) Amplify-and-Forward: Under the amplify-and-forward scheme, the relay multiplies its
received signal by a factor β and forwards it to the users. Hence, one can treat the overall
system as a SIMO system from the users’ view point, as done in Section III-C, and therefore
the achievable rates at the users under superposition coding are given by
rAF,P1 = log
(
1 + |h1|2αP¯ + |g1|
2β2|hr|2αP¯
1 + |g1|2β2
)
, (72)
rAF,P2 =log
(
1 +
|h2|2α¯P¯
1+|h2|2αP¯ +
|g2|2β2|hr|2α¯P¯
1+|g2|2β2
(
1+|hr|2αP¯
)
)
, (73)
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Fig. 3. Downlink NOMA system model with an untrusted relay node, and active users.
where the superscript AF, P is to denote the amplify-and-forward scheme under the passive user
mode, and the term β satisfies the following power constraint:
β2 =
P − P¯
1 + |hr|2P¯ . (74)
Note that since |g1|2 ≥ |g2|2, it holds that |g1|2β2|hr|2α¯P¯1+|g1|2β2(1+|hr|2αP¯) ≥
|g2|2β2|hr|2α¯P¯
1+|g2|2β2(1+|hr |2αP¯)
, ensuring suc-
cessful employment of successive interference cancellation at the strong user. Now the achievable
secrecy rates are given by
rAF,Ps,1 =
1
2
[
rAF,P1 − log
(
1 + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
, (75)
rAF,Ps,2 =
1
2
[
rAF,P2 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
, (76)
where, again, the extra 1/2 term is due to sending the same message over two equal phases.
B. Active User Mode
In the active user mode, communication also occurs over two phases as in the passive user
mode except that the users send a cooperative jamming signal during the first phase to confuse
the relay, and hence the notation active user. Our focus is on half-duplex nodes, and therefore
we assume that the users cannot receive the BS’s signal during the first phase while they are
sending the jamming signal; instead, they only rely on the signal received from the relay during
the second (forwarding) phase to decode their messages. Thus, in effect, there is no direct link
between the BS and the users in the active user mode, and the model converts to a two-hop
network, see Fig. 3.
Let Jz denote the jamming signal, with the beamfoming vector J ∈ C2 and z ∼ CN (0, 1).
Thus, the received signal at the relay during the first phase is now given by
yr = hrx+ g
†Jz + nr, (77)
21
where g , [g1 g2]. The system’s total power budget in this case is divided into P¯ ≤ P for the
BS, P − P¯ − δ for the relay, and δ ≤ P − P¯ for the users.
In order to maximally diminish the relay’s decoding ability, the beamforming vector is chosen
as
J =
g
‖g‖
√
δ. (78)
The beamforming vector J is computed at the relay and then shared with the two users so that
they compute their cooperative jamming signal.5 We discuss the achievable secrecy rates under
the two relaying schemes, compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward, next.
1) Compress-and-Forward: The compress-and-forward scheme with active users is similar to
the scheme presented in Section IV-A.1 except that there is no direct link. In addition, the users
subtract their jamming signal from their received signals from the relay before decoding. Hence,
the achievable rates at the (active) users are given by
rCF,A1 = log
(
1 +
|hr|2αP¯
1 + σ2Q
)
, (79)
rCF,A2 = log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + |hr|2αP¯ + σ2Q
)
, (80)
where the superscript CF,A is to denote the compress-and-forward scheme under the active
user mode, and the quantization noise power σ2Q satisfies the same inequalities in (66) and (68)
after setting the direct links’ gains h1 = h2 = 0 and replacing P − P¯ by P − P¯ − δ. Hence,
upon recalling that |g1|2 ≥ |g2|2, σ2Q is now given by
σ2Q =
|hr|2P¯ + 1
|g2|2(P − P¯ − δ) . (81)
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rates are given by
rCF,As,1 =
1
2
[
rCF,A1 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2αP¯
1 + ‖g‖2δ
)]+
, (82)
rCF,As,2 =
1
2
[
rCF,A2 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + ‖g‖2δ + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
. (83)
5Observe that the specific design of the beamforming vector in this case merely requires sharing the relay-strong user’s channel
gain with the weak user and vice versa.
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2) Amplify-and-Forward: Proceeding similarly as above, the users subtract their jamming
signal from their received signals from the relay before decoding. This can be done if the term
β is known at the users, which is achieved by sharing the BS-to-relay channel gain hr, along with
the relay’s transmit power, with them. Following the approach in Section IV-A.2, the achievable
rates at the (active) users under the amplify-and-forward scheme are given by
rAF,A1 = log
(
1 +
|g1|2β2|hr|2αP¯
1 + |g1|2β2
)
, (84)
rAF,A2 = log
(
1 +
|g2|2β2|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + |g2|2β2
(
1 + |hr|2αP¯
)
)
, (85)
where the term β now satisfies the following power constraint:
β2 =
P − P¯ − δ
1 + |hr|2P¯ . (86)
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rates in this case are given by
rAF,As,1 =
1
2
[
rAF,A1 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2αP¯
1 + ‖g‖2δ
)]+
, (87)
rAF,As,2 =
1
2
[
rAF,A2 − log
(
1 +
|hr|2α¯P¯
1 + ‖g‖2δ + |hr|2αP¯
)]+
. (88)
Remark 1 We note that, operationally, the case in which the users do not transmit a cooperative
jamming signal is equivalent to the passive user mode. Mathematically, however, setting the
cooperative jamming power δ = 0 in (82)-(83) and (87)-(88) does not yield back the secrecy
rates achieved in the passive user mode given by (70)-(71) and (75)-(76), respectively. The
reason behind this is that in the active user mode, the considered system is a two-hop network
with no direct link, and setting δ = 0 does not physically re-establish such direct link. The
original passive user mode secrecy rates cannot be achieved by merely setting δ = 0 then, but
by rather changing the mode of operation from the beginning. We also note that comparing the
performances of passive and active user modes is not straightforward; we discuss this in more
detail in Section V below.
Remark 2 Upon substituting σ2Q of (81) in (79) and (80), and substituting β
2 of (86) in (84)
and (85), we readily get that rCF,A1 < r
AF,A
1 and r
CF,A
2 = r
AF,A
2 , making the amplify-and-
forward scheme more useful in the active user mode (with respect to the strong user) than the
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compress-and-froward scheme. This is mainly attributed to the fact that in the second phase of
compress-and-forward, the relay designs the quantization noise so that both users are able to
decode, and hence the weak user’s channel dominates, unlike the amplify-and-forward scheme
that allows each user to relatively make the best use of its channel. This comparison does not
follow, however, in the passive user mode. In there, the presence of a direct channel from the
BS to the legitimate users allows either scheme (compress-and-forward or amplify-and-forward)
to potentially outperform the other, depending on the CSI and other system parameters, which
we elaborate on in Section V.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
In this section, we present some numerical examples to assess the performance of the proposed
schemes in this paper. We first discuss how to evaluate the optimal power budget distribution
among the communicating nodes, such that the achievable secrecy rate region is maximized.
Specifically, we characterize the boundary of the achievable secrecy rate region by solving the
following problem:
max
α,P¯
µrns,1 + (1− µ)rns,2
s.t. 0 ≤ P¯ ≤ P, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (89)
for some µ ∈ [0, 1], and the superscript n differentiates between the proposed schemes in the
paper, i.e., n can be J , DF , or AF for the trusted relays scenario of Section III, or it can be
(CF, P ), (AF, P ), (CF,A), or (AF,A) for the untrusted relay scenario of Section IV. When
considering the active user mode in the untrusted relay scenario discussed in Section IV-B, we
also maximize over the jamming power δ, under the constraint: δ ≤ P − P¯ . We use a line search
algorithm to numerically solve the above problem. Note that the feasible set is bounded, which
facilitates the convergence of the algorithm to an optimal point. We set β = µ in (34) and (57)
so as to design the beamforming vector in proportion to the priority given to each user in the
weighted sum rate maximization problem (89).
The physical layout that we consider is a simple one-dimensional system, where the strong
user is located at 30 meters away from the BS, the weak user at 40 meters away, and the
eavesdropper at 50 meters away. For the trusted relays scenario, we have K = 5 relays, and for
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rate regions of the proposed schemes for the trusted relays scenario. Solid lines are when le = 50
meters, and dashed lines are when le = 20 meters.
simplicity we assume that they are all close enough to each other that they are approximately
at the same distance of 15 meters away from the BS. To emphasize the effect of distance on
the channel gains, we use the following simplified channel model [13]: h =
√
1/lγejθ, where
h is the channel gain between two nodes, l is the distance between them, γ = 3.5 is the path
loss exponent, and θ is a uniform random variable in [0, 2pi]. We denote by l1, l2, le, and lr
the distances from the BS to the strong user, weak user, eavesdropper, and relays, respectively.
We set P to 90 dBm.6 We run 1000 iterations of the simulations and compute the average
performance.
We start by presenting some results for the trusted relays scenario of Section III. In Fig. 4, we
plot the achievable secrecy rate regions of the proposed schemes (cooperative jamming, decode-
and-forward and amplify-and-forward) along with the direct transmission scheme (without the
relays’ help). Solid lines represent the system parameters stated above, and dashed lines represent
the situation in which le = 20 meters. We see that when le = 50 meters, cooperative jamming
outperforms direct transmission and is in turn outperformed by both decode-and-forward and
amplify-and-forward which perform relatively close to each other. With le = 20 meters, direct
transmission achieves zero secrecy rates since the eavesdropper is closer to the BS than both
users. However, strictly positive secrecy rates are achievable by all the relaying schemes. We
also see that cooperative jamming performs best in this case, since the relays are close to the
6Note that the noise power is normalized in this paper, and hence P also represents the SNR.
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy sum rates of the proposed schemes for the trusted relays scenario vs. the number of relays. Solid
lines are when le = 50 meters, and dashed lines are when le = 20 meters.
eavesdropper and hence their jamming effect is quite powerful. For parts of the region, it even
performs very close to decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward for the le = 50 meters case.
Next, we show the effect of the number of relays on the achievable secrecy sum rates of
the proposed schemes in Fig. 5. Again we observe that all relaying schemes achieve positive
secrecy sum rate when le = 20 meters and that cooperative jamming performs best in this case.
We also observe that amplify-and-forward is more sensitive than the other schemes to the number
of relays, and that the decode-and-forward scheme’s performance does not change much with
the number of relays, especially for the case when le = 20 meters. This is primarily due to
the fact that in (27) and (28), the larger the number of relays, the larger the first term in the
minimum regarding the relays-to-users rate gets, yet the second term in the minimum regarding
the BS-to-relays rate stays almost the same and represents the bottleneck to the system.
Finally, we fix the users’ distances and show the effect of the relays’ distance from the BS (and
hence the users) on the achievable secrecy sum rates in Fig. 6. For this case, we vary the relays’
distance but still keep them closer to the BS than the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The
dashed lines in this case are when le = 27 meters. We see that only the cooperative jamming
scheme’s performance monotonically increases with the relays’ distance from the BS, which is
again attributed to the fact that the jamming effect is more powerful when the relays get closer
to the eavesdropper. For both the decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward schemes, their
performance is best when the relays are midway between the BS and the users, with decode-
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Fig. 6. Achievable secrecy sum rates for the trusted relays scenario vs. the relays’ distance from the BS. Solid lines are when
le = 50 meters, and dashed lines are when le = 27 meters.
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Fig. 7. Achievable secrecy rate region for the untrusted relay scenario with passive users.
and-forward performing better for smaller values of lr than amplify-and-forward, and vice versa.
We now conclude this section by presenting some results for the untrusted relay scenario of
Section IV. For this case, we slightly change the distances to l1 = 40 meters, l2 = 50 meters, and
lr = 30 meters. Note that treating the relay as an eavesdropper achieves zero secrecy rates in this
case, since the relay is closer to the BS than both users. Thus, we only show the compress-and-
forward and the amplify-and-forward achievable secrecy rates for this setting. In Fig. 7, we plot
the achievable secrecy rate regions of the proposed schemes under the passive user mode. We
see that amplify-and-forward performs better for the strong user, while compress-and-forward
performs better for the weak user. Choosing the best relaying scheme therefore depends on
which part of the region the system is to operate at. In Fig. 8, we plot the achievable secrecy
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Fig. 8. Achievable secrecy rate region for the untrusted relay scenario with active users.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Fig. 9. Achievable secrecy sum rate for the untrusted relay scenario with passive users vs. the relay’s distance from the BS.
rate regions of the proposed schemes under the active user mode. As mentioned in Remark 2,
we see in this case that amplify-and-forward outperforms compress-and-forward.
Next, we show the effect of the relay’s location, lr, on the achievable secrecy sum rate, for the
passive user mode in Fig. 9, and the active user mode in Fig. 10. From the figures, we see that
under passive users, compress-and-forward performs better when the relay is relatively closer to
the BS, and is outperformed by amplify-and-forward when the relays gets further away. Under
active users, as we have seen in Fig. 8, amplify-and-forward outperforms compress-and-forward
for all values of lr. We also see that the optimal value of lr that maximizes the secrecy sum rate
achievable under compress-and-forward is not the furthest possible from the BS.
Finally, upon comparing Fig. 7 to Fig. 8, and Fig. 9 to Fig. 10, we observe that the secrecy
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Fig. 10. Achievable secrecy sum rate for the untrusted relay scenario with active users vs. the relay’s distance from the BS.
rates achieved under active users are generally better than those achieved under passive users.
In what follows, we present a summary of implications of the numerical results presented in
this section in Figs. 4 through 10, with the purpose of providing insights into secure system
design of NOMA cooperative communications:
• When there is a close-by eavesdropper, and there exists a number of trusted relays, one
should use cooperative jamming. On the other hand, when the eavesdropper is far away,
one should focus on either decode-and-forward or amplify-and-forward.
• The amplify-and-forward (resp. decode-and-forward) scheme is the most (resp. least) sen-
sitive to the number of trusted relays in the network, when it comes to the rate of increase
of the secrecy sum rate.
• Whether one has a number of trusted relays, or needs to deal with an untrusted relay, the
location of the relay(s) relative to the BS (and hence the users/eavesdropper) greatly affects
the achievable secrecy rates, and needs to be carefully designed.
• In the case of an untrusted relay, compress-and-forward can be more useful than amplify-
and-forward only in the passive user mode. In the active user mode, amplify-and-forward
performs better.
• In general, active users achieve higher secrecy rates than passive users in the untrusted relay
scenario.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Secure transmission schemes in a downlink two-user SISO NOMA system have been con-
sidered, under two main scenarios: existence of an external eavesdropper, and communicating
through an untrusted half-duplex relay. For the first scenario, employment of trusted cooperative
half-duplex relays has been proposed, and various relaying schemes have been studied, namely,
cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. For each scheme, secure
beamforming signals have been derived at the relays to boost up the secrecy rates achieved
at the users. For the second scenario, two modes of operation have been studied, namely,
passive user mode and active user mode, under each of which two relaying schemes have
been considered, namely, compress-and-forward and amplify-and-forward. For either of the two
considered scenarios, the performance of each relaying scheme has been thoroughly analyzed
and compared, under the same total system power budget. The results have shown that choosing
the best relaying scheme and/or mode of operation is highly dependent on the physical layout of
the network, especially the distances between the nodes. Extensive tradeoffs among the different
schemes have also been discussed.
One direct step forward as a future direction for this line of research would be to extend
the schemes developed in this paper to nodes with multiple antennas; the case with more than
two legitimate users; and to the case without eavesdropper’s CSI availability. Another direction
would be to consider full-duplex relay nodes, in which case one would be able to combine, e.g.,
decode-and-forward simultaneously with cooperative jamming in the trusted cooperative relays
scenario to further hurt the eavesdropper, similar to the approach followed in [14]. It would also
be of interest to extend the results of the untrusted relay scenario for multiple untrusted relays
and/or add an external eavesdropper.
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